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Sunday, 30 January 2011

Global Economy: Déjà Vu or Misplaced Pessimism?

The narrative of risk is a narrative of Irony
- Ulrich Beck

January 2011 was truly momentous as far as the financial markets are concerned. The inauguration of the New Year saw optimism reign supreme with the last of the bears sulking in hibernation – or so it seemed. Centuries of capitalism and markets have taught us (though public memory is always short) that it is exactly at times that when last bear seems to have been gored it is not the bear that is slain but it is big bloated obese, clumsy bull that meets an ignominious hospitalisation – at least for a time. The vice versa is very much applicable in case of bear markets. Thenceforth the cycle starts all over again. Only time will tell us whether this is validated for 2011, though for the market participants ipso facto validation may be no solace. Importantly, January 2011 vindicate what a famous social scientist had to say about risk: Ironically, in the case of the present-day financial markets, the risks were apparent to any objective observer since at least the beginning of November 2010, if not earlier. A pertinent question that we have to ask is if the nature of risks were so easily discernible with the information in the public domain for so long, why have the markets started discounting these factors only now? Hopefully, by the end of this note, I would have thrown light on at least some of the questions that are on our minds.

Apart from the plateful of risks that existed at the end of 2010, there are two new additions to the problems list. First, the rise of new geo-political risks due to political rumblings in North Africa. The problem with political protest is that nobody knows which dictator could be the next. Two, the surprise downgrade of Japan by S&P; third, the gradual realisation of the magnitude of the problems of overheating and inflation in the emerging markets and, last the clear evidence that the fiscal austerity is not working in Euro zone.

Starting with the first (political turmoil) it is clear that the problems that started in Tunisia have spread to Egypt and are likely to spread to Algeria and Morocco. The rise in food prices, which usually form 25-50 per cent of family budgets in the developing world make large parts of the Middle East and the developing world a tinderbox of combustible material. In the era of a globalised supply chain each country has its own position. The case of Ivory Coast is instructive: political turmoil (unrelated to that in North Africa) have led to a Cocoa prices shooting up to a 20 year high. While the political uprising in Tunisia may be ignored due to the size of the country, Egypt promises to be more interesting due to its strategic importance, economically as well as politically. Politically, Egypt is one of the most important countries of the Arab League and the home to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal is important because nearly eight per cent of world’s trade passes through that region as do another one million barrels of oil per day. It has been pointed out that if the oil pipeline that runs adjacent to the Canal is included then nearly 4 million barrels of oil pass through it. More importantly, at the present juncture the new global supply chain cannot ignore the shortening of the travel time between the east and the west by ships transporting good. The usage of the canal shortens the voyage of ships by about 12 days, any re-routing of ships (which has not happened till now) will force an increase in costs – something that most debt stricken consumers in the west can ill afford. Companies are in an even greater precarious position and they cannot absorb the increase in costs. Hence, the events in Egypt are yet another unknown to the current already fluid global economy and hopefully they will not be aggravated. The longer the political uncertainty the greater the problem for the world economy and a quick end will be beneficial to everybody.

A more pressing problem for the global economy that was signalled in the last one week was the surprise warnings from the rating agencies which brought back the issue of sovereign debt back to the forefront. S&P cut Japan’s US$10.6 trillion debt by one level to AA-, the same as China due to lack of policy traction, shrinking workforce and rising interest rate burden. While this may not have an immediate impact on the Japanese economy, it will be a major problem if the world economy does not recover in 3-4 years time. Japan is an excellent case-study of what a large, modern economy has to endure once a debt driven real estate fuelled bubble bursts. Japan’s tax revenues comprised only of about 50 percent of the country’s expenditure in 2010. Interest rate payments comprise of nearly 28 percent of the tax revenues. The combined government debt is expected to reach 230 per cent of GDP this year.

Japan, however, has been spared of the sovereign debt issues largely because nearly 95 per cent of its debt is held by local investors. There are however, a number of problems that Japan will have to grapple with in the nearly future (next 2-3 years). First its population has been declining since 2005. Second, its savings rate has declined substantially from about 15 per cent of GDP in 1990 to the present less than 3 per cent. It is expected to reach negative territory in the next 2-3 years. In the mean time Japan will keep drawing down its substantial foreign exchange reserves (of about US$3 trillion) to meet interest as well as debt repayment needs. Third, IMF has recently warned that Japan’s public debt to revenue ratio will rise from 263 per cent in 2007 to about 482 per cent by 2015. Last, Japan’s economy has largely stayed afloat due to its burgeoning trade with China. Imagine the consequences of the bursting of the Chinese bubble.

The US was warned by the rating agency Moody’s that their debt will be downgraded in future, if measures are not implemented to start reducing the fiscal deficit. That came just a day after US President called for a spending freeze for the next five years. The advantage of fiscal consolidation in the present juncture is still hotly debated and at this point it seems to be a highly polarising and never-ending topic. Suffice to point out that a cursory glance at Euro zone (in the present) would make it clear that it is not the panacea for the problems in the world economy.

Japan & US Economy: So Near, Yet So Far!
At this point, may be helpful to compare the case of Japan and USA. The charts below (Sourced from Gluskin Sheff) will help us place the economies in proper perspective. To this one needs to note the recent US Federal Reserve inflation (excluding fuel and food) gauge for 2010 indicated a rise of 0.8 per cent, while their comfort zone is 1.6 to 2 per cent. This pronounced deflationary pressure that lurks under the headlines blitz about quantitative easing may be responsible for what seems to be US Fed’s insistence on completing its QE2 even if there were to be marginal improvement in the US economy – which till date has been illusionary.

Private Spending on Housing
The chart below provides a comparison of Japan and the US private spending on housing. The marginal improvement that was seen in the US housing spending was due to spending that took advantage of tax concessions. It has been pointed out that the Case-Shiller index is now about

3.3 per cent from the all-time low reached in early 2009, indicating that all the measures to boost the economy have had only limited impact. Historically housing and housing related services contributed nearly 18 per cent of US GDP .

Three Month Treasury bill Yields (in per cent)
The eerie similarities do not end only with housing. The US Treasury yields look like a mirror image of the two post-bubble economies. The bond market is considered to be one of the best barometers of the economy. If the past is an indicator of the future then the US bond yields will remain low for a long time, as in the case of Japan. 
Central Bank Reserve Credit Expansion
The rise in the markets may have more to do with the three sets of charts that we have provided below. It is apparent that there is a direct correlation between the rising deficits, rising credit expansion and the rising markets due to the growing financialisation and the use of derivatives. 

The Market behaviour (see chart below) has substantial correlation to the rising balance sheet of the central banks

Government Deficit as a Share of GDP
There seems to be a lot of thinking that interest rates will have to rise in 2011 due to inflationary pressures. That seems to unlikely. Since late 2009, I have held the view that interest rates will continue to remain close to Zero till the end of 2011 or even mid 2012. I continued to hold this view despite lot of talk in 2010 about the rise in interest rates in the USA and EU being round the corner. I continue to believe that interest rates will remain at or close to Zero till the middle of 2012, if not beyond. The position of the consumer or the corporate sector in USA, EU or Japan is such that they are not in a position (financially) to sustain their anaemic financial health if there is an interest rate hike. The bond market clearly seems to have come to the realisation after the scare that interest rate hike is not due anytime soon. Goldman’s sale of its first 30 year bonds in more than year priced at 6.25 per cent was a resounding success, while the US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities attracted less than average demand. The bid-to-cover ration was down from 2.91 in November to 2.37 in mid-January.

This is not to claim that there is no improvement in the global economies. I believe that the improvement is marginal and it has been the product of massive amounts of government spending, globally. Governments are fearful or unwilling to remove the stimulus despite clamour.

The chart below places the constant claims about the improvement in retail sales in the USA. It is the chart of retail sales, six quarters after a recession.
Source: Gluskin Sheff
Euro Zone: No improvement on the Horizon
Euro Zone and UK are no better. UK’s economy contracted by and unexpected 0.5 per cent last quarter – a phenomenon that was wrongly blamed on the weather. Consumer confidence in the UK collapsed to its lowest level since March 2009. It has been pointed out that in 35 years since the index was established, confidence collapsed by eight points only on six occasions, the last time being during the middle of the 1992 recession. European Sovereign debt issues have no signs of easing. Bond prices continue to remain at alleviated levels indicating stressed fundamentals despite all the intervention by the European Central Bank. These high levels indicate that the problem countries have no possibility of riding out the storm. Interestingly monthly statistics do not any major improvement in the major economy. Personal loans in the Euro region declined as did money supply. It is clear that austerity measures may be having started to bite. The thinking that private consumption will replace government spending seems to be a clear case of misplaced optimism. A factor that most observers seem to have missed is that as economies contract, tax targets are unlikely to be met, thereby making the fiscal situation worse in the long-term term despite short-term improvements.

A comparison bond yields since our update on European Situation on 10th January 2011 places the state of the bond markets in proper perspective.

Bond Yields of Select countries (in percentage)
Name of Country
10 Yr Bond Yields
2st November 2010
10 Yr Bond Yield
(10th January 2011)
10 Year Bond Yield
(28th January 2011)
Spain
4.28
5.5
5.45
Portugal
6.23
7.10
7.07
Greece
10.79
12.60
11.46
Ireland
7.29
8.91
9.15
Belgium
3.31
4.13
4.29
Italy
3.96
4.81
4.78
France
2.88
3.34
3.52
Germany
2.47
2.87
3.14
UK
3.03
3.51
3.65
Source: Compiled from Bloomberg

The above table clearly illustrates that the pressure on most of the countries remains largely intact. This in turn cascades into a system of gradual deterioration of the macro economic fundamentals of those countries that are forced to borrow high cost of money from the bond markets. The EU emergency fund is not aiding to any improvement, instead it is forcing the countries to borrow money at a higher cost. An interesting aspect of the bond markets that has largely missed the attention of the popular press is the gradual increase in the yields of France and Germany, which will be forced to pay for the bailouts. This indicates that there is an urgent need to think of other solutions as any future bailouts would risk an increase in the cost of borrowing for Germany, something which the electorate is already unhappy about.

In fact the most likely fall out of the present crisis is the likely political impact. We can safely say that in the event of an election, none of the incumbents may be re-elected, a fact that has dawned on most of the political class of Europe. This in turn is leading to the postponement of the day of reckoning in almost all the countries, including India. Even a unitary State like China cannot ignore the discontent of the people. In fact they need to be more cautious as a revolt in most of the democracies will only mean a loss of power while in the case of authoritarian states’ it will mean loss of the rulers head – remember the French Revolution of 1789! This is not to claim that Europe or other countries are on the brink of a revolution. That may not happen in the present conditions. One of the reasons why there may be that the decline in the standard of living has happened so gradually that a number of people have actually forgotten the crisis. After all, ignorance does seem to be bliss in this case.

The importance of this gradually process of deterioration in the real economy would have gone unnoticed but for some danger signs, which are flashing – some after a long time. These include the rise in food prices and the precipitous fall in the Baltic Dry Index. FAO Food Price Index has shot up by almost 25 per cent since December 2009, with a number of agricultural commodities almost doubling. Cotton has doubled from June 2008 levels. Wheat and Corn are up more than 50 percent over the past one year. The Thomson-Reuters Jefferies CRY commodities index has increased by almost 50% since May 2010. See Chart Below shows the movement of the Index since 2008.
 Source: Bloomberg
 Any discussion about the world economy, however brief, would be incomplete without a mention of the emerging markets, especially China and India.

Speculating on Speculation about China
Any discussion of China invariably leads us to important questions about the nature of Chinese bubble and when it would burst. The short, candid answer is: nobody knows. Essentially we are either speculating or speculating on somebody else’s speculation. In fact, that could be frank confession with all my views. If I really knew the precise answer (apart from rational guesses based on analysis) then I would be a billionaire many times over. But that after all is the nature of an increasingly globalised finance. Since I am a bit knowledgeable about nature of finance, I probably make a spate of observations that may turn out to be correct –especially over the medium to long-term, though I must confess that my short-term guesses have been horrendously inaccurate.

China is very important to the global economy for the simple reason that it China accounts for 35 per cent of global use of base metals, 21 per cent of the grains, and 10 per cent of the of crude oil. The fact that it has lent nearly US$896 billion to the USA is yet another reason why it is grudgingly accepted as an important power by Western Nations. The problem with most of the commodity markets is that relatively small amounts of money can move the markets substantially, unlike the currency markets. Barclays has pointed out that the total investments into commodities in 2010 accounted for only about US$385 billion.

There is no need to repeat a lot about the over-heating of the Chinese economy. When we first pointed out the possibility it was considered to be paranoia. Suffice to point out the latest indications that clearly show that the Chinese economy continues to overheat by the day and the government risks losing control. Property prices continue to rise and the government has no answers, and it is thinking in terms of price controls. It has introduced property taxes in different cites on an experimental basis and has increased the down payment for second homes from 50 per cent to 60 per cent. It has sought a differential system of capital reserve ratio of banks which exceed lending targets. However all these measures will do little to control the price spiral in the next few months. Unfortunately, since China’s growth is dependent on easy liquidity conditions and state subsidies, it can do little to upset the apple cart, lest it lead to social unrest. There are rumours that the annual bank lending target has not been set, due to the lack of unanimity amongst the senior policy makers. Commercial banks lent a total of 7.5 trillion Yuan (US$1=8 Yuan) while in 2009 it was 9.5 trillion Yuan. There are rumours that the lending targets have been fixed at 7.5 trillion Yuan, the same as last year. The interesting aspect that needs to be watched closely is how the banks deal with nearly US$250 billion off balance sheets this year and the consequences it has on the lending. It is still unclear as to how the present inflationary spiral impacts the savings, which have been the source of China’s economic strength over the past few decades.

The chart below provides an overview of the gross savings charges sector wise in China.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics

The inflationary spiral has led to a decline of savings over the past year (see chart below). Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that the savings are being withdrawn with the intention of speculation in the property market. That along with the rising inflation may be detrimental to the long-term health of the Chinese economy. The inflationary spiral and the rise in commodity prices have led to a scramble for commodities in China – the latest commodity that they are hoarding is cotton.

Source: National Bureau of Statistics,
Flow of Funds data and Urban and Rural Household Survey.

The problem for China the policy options seem to be few. One is that they need to increase interest rates, and two they need let the Yuan rise in value. But both these will invariably hurt its competitiveness in the global market place, thereby undermining the fundamental reason why it has succeeded – due to its importance as a low cost producer. The total value of China’s imports and exports was US$3 trillion, of which about 13 per cent was trade between China and USA.  China’s dilemma is that if they drastically reduce the lending target then they risk choking funds to half complete projects, while if they continue to lend huge amounts of money then it would risk continued inflation. The money supply increases over the past few years should be seen in the context of the increase in the minimum wages by 21 percent in China that have come into effect since 1st January 2011. While this measure will improve the purchasing power of the workers, it would not help reduce the inflationary spiral. It is pertinent to note that in terms of value addition, China ranks very low. A high profile case that has recently been cited by Pascal Lamy, the Director General of WTO (in Financial Times, London) is that of Apple’s iPhone is instructive of the nature of China’s economy. Though the value of iPhone exports is estimated at US$1.9 billion, in terms of value addition, it is only US$73.5 million.

India
Indian markets have taken a beating during the first one month of the New Year. The hyperbole and exalted sense of India’s growth potential that was a staple of India’s inerudite media and large segments of the middle class has had to face a rude awakening in the past two quarters. The structural shallowness of the Indian economy is seen as gaping. Credit becomes scarce with an additional demand of about US$25 billion. Tight liquidity conditions will get far worse before they get any worse. I believe that they are unlikely to improve dramatically before October 2011 due to a variety of factors. Once again none of these factors are new. They have been building over the last few months – at least three months to my knowledge. Food inflation is just one of them. Rising oil prices and rising food prices mean that they have substantially impacted the poor and middle class – though in varied measures. Food has an impact on the poorer segements as 30-40 percent of their monthly budgets are utilised for that, while rising food and fuel is akin to a tax on the middle classes – the only difference is that it burns a hole in the pocket every week. The markets are down because they seem to have belated realised that these are not about to change in the near term and hot money flowed in has decided that India is too pricey given its risks. Only belatedly are they realising that in an era of rising prices, especially oil prices, India’s record current account deficit of 4.1 per cent of GDP which is funded wholly by short-term portfolio flows probably does not deserve such high valuations.

A close scrutiny of the results of the Indian corporate sector hides reveals the stress that a large number of companies, especially those dependent on consumption face. The steady deterioration in their balance sheets seems to have started – and it seems like late 2007-early 2008 period: Déjà Vu all over again. Suffice to say that this margin erosion due to tepid sales, increase in raw material costs and rising interest rates have only started to bite. India bulls have to look at the results of banks, Hindustan Unilever, ITC, Tata Global Beverages, Nestle and Maruti. The list goes on. This is not to claim that these companies will run into losses. Not in the next two years (at least). Instead, I think it is indicative of a medium term trend – which is likely to last at least to the end of September 2011, if not beyond. The companies that will be severely affected by this trend will be the small and medium enterprises, which would be hard pressed to stay afloat. Can this process be avoided? The short answer is yes, but only if commodities collapse by about 20 per cent.

A more ominous problem is building up in the banking sector. RBI has been warning of Asset-Liability mismatch in the banking sector. It has warned banks that while the tenure of their deposits has declined, with most of them being less than two years their lending has been mostly to the infrastructure sector (i
“RBI Again Warns Banks on Asset-Liability Mismatch” Business Standard, 28 January 2011, Section II, p.4.). Nearly 50 percent of the liabilities of banks fall due in less than one year.  It points out that nearly 58 percent of their investments are those above 3 years. At the same time their Non-performing assets have risen rather sharply. The saving grace in the Indian economy has been that the governments’ balance sheet has not deteriorated due to non-recurring sale of telecom spectrum and some IPOs. 

Before concluding it may be useful to look at the charts that compare the Shanghai Composite Index and the India's NSE Nifty Index (Below). Both the charts indicate that the time for optimism may have ended (as the Chinese Index (in black) or is about to end (NSE index in Blue). 

It is clear that the optimists may be badly jolted in 2011. 

Wednesday, 12 January 2011

Voices from the field that Vinod Khosla Needs to Hear

The recent crisis in Andhra Pradesh related to microfinance has brought to the fore the simplistic notions that the a number of financial sector players seem to have about the nature of the crisis. Conspiracy theories abound about the causes for the crisis. Proponents of the microfinance sector seem intent on blaming everybody else, except themselves. The latest is Vinod Khosla, the renowned Venture Capitalist based in Silicon Valley, California, USA. Khosla is reported to have claimed that politicians are ruining the MFI sector for their own gains. Vinod Kholsa, and other probably seem to need to take tour of the villages of AP where SKS' (where they invested) actions would make Shylock blush. Those who have conducted field survey's are shocked with the nature of collection methods used by SKS. One person observed "SKS' staff donot even wait for two minutes, leave alone days, if there is a delay in repaying the loan". It is probably time for private equity to revisit their notion that "microfinance is the best thing that has happened to the poor in decades". But beyond a point, we cannot blame him: after all, that is probably what happens when you look a business model through the prism of Silicon Valley and the Stock Markets (both of which have difficulty looking beyond the immediate three months).

Any field survey in Andhra Pradesh in the aftermath of the recent Microfinance crisis would highlight a number of important, albeit dangerous trends, in not only the economic sphere but also in the realm of social relations. The growth of the NBFC microfinance organisations seems to be gradually altering social relations in a manner that is not in the long-term interests of the local community. NBFC microfinance companies have grown by practicising a business model that is based on peer-pressure and practices that are completely impersonal in nature. Both these are practices that have generally speaking, not done well in other contexts, especially in the sphere of moneylending and banking. The traditional characteristics of a banker (and moneylenders) are considered to be ones that are based on maintaining a low profile, staid and maintaining personal relationship with the clients, while constantly assessing the financial health of the client. By nature, they are (at least were in the past) extremely cautious. Robert Frost summed up this nature of the bankers of the bygone: 'a bank is a place where they lend you an umbrella in fair weather and ask for it back when it begins to rain'. The success of the informal moneylenders is often due to their intricate understanding of the local economic and social dynamics of the community where they operate. Unfortunately, the MFIs of the present seem to have none of the positive business characteristics, even if we were to be convinced about the inherent enlightened self-interest in their mind.

Transcripts of field surveys provide valuable insights that are a far cry from the public claims made by the MFI which claim that their activities enable the upliftment of the poor, expand and facilitate financial inclusion, global best practices, etc. Field based interviews of the victims of microfinance in Mahabubnagar District of Andhra Pradesh indicate that the MFIs do not really care about the cause for borrowing, though officially they call claim that they are lending only for productive purposes. It is claimed that they are lending money that is mostly (90% of the time) used as working capital in the petty commodity production in the non-formal enterprises. It is a standard practice that the agents of the microfinance company visit a village, go around asking people if they want a loan. In case borrowers are interested then they have to form a group and the company then appoints a 'leader' through whom, the loans are disbursed. The first loan size that varies from Rs.6000-10,000 and once this loan is repaid then they increase the loan size, usually in multiples of Rs.10,000. Once the first loan has been repaid, the business dynamics undergo a major change. Whatever little caution exists, is thrown to the wind. Credit is freely distributed, Either they have give a smaller loan than the outstanding (popularly referred to as 'Pilla loan' - verbatim: which may be literally translated into, meaning kid/child loan. The larger previous loan is referred to as 'pedda' loan, or bigger loan). The interesting aspect the borrowers disclosed, was that the loans were taken by members in the names of the women folk, usually for onward use by the male members of the family. This would probably mean that the statistics related to the economic empowerment of women may have to taken with more than a pinch of salt. However, there is need for greater clarity on this issue.

The other valuable insight is one that concerns the use of peer pressure and what it may be doing to the social relations in the local community. The reason why the microfinance companies claim to have a 99 per cent loan recovery is due to the use of peer pressure. Interestingly, the AP refutes the claim of 99 per cent repayment record and has pointed out in its submission to the RBI appointed Y.H.Malegam Committee (Download the submission) that the MFIs are actually disbursing New loans to borrowers so that they can repay the old loans - a common practice in the case of the banking sector. There is a term that bankers often use for such tactics: 'ever greening'. In that way there is theoretically no default though the size of the loan keeps increasing.

If one member of the group does not pay then the collective liability of the group invariably means that all the other members have to repay the loan. The next best thing that the remaining members of the group, which most of the time are part of the same social circle, can do is to go to the house of the borrower who is unable to repay and press the defaulter to pay. Since it is member of their social circle who are pressing the defaulter, they have two options, either to repay the loan by disposing any assets that they have or to simply pack their bags and leave the village. Those with property would find it difficult to leave the village and hence would have to either dispose their property or if they are unwilling then it could lead to tensions in the family. The rise of such tensions may have played an important part for those who committed suicide. The case of Ch.Hari in Atmakur Mandal who committed suicide is instructive. He had borrowed nearly 40,000 from three different MFIs and his weekly installments to the three MFI cumulatively add up to about Rs.3,000. His mother claims that he used to earn about Rs.300 a day and was regular in payment of the installment. Unfortunately  due to some health reasons he could not work for about a month. He went to Bangalore in search of employment. His brother's wife and her extended family were the other members of the group. When Hari fell behind on repayment, his sister-in-law's family members went to Hari's house and started abusing him. Hari sought help from his mother and asked her to dispose their house and loan him the money. They refused and instead offered him a loan of about 3,000 Rupees, which would suffice the dues to the MFI. However, the MFI's representatives refused to accept the installment and instead demanded complete loan pre-payment. Hari's mother claims that unable to bear the social pressure he consumed suicide even as the ruckus was taking place outside his house.  Ironically, the loan would have been repaid in another four weeks.

An MFI employee is involved in the activities of a set of groups only for a period of eleven months, ostensibly in order to see to it that they do not develop personal relations with the borrowers. They are usually transferred to either another branch or they are simply asked to coordinate the activities of other groups in a different set of villages/groups. Needless to say they are expected to fulfill credit disbursement targets.

The AP government has already decided to introduce of technology initiatives as part of the regulatory measures package. They have introduced a website that would have all details of the nearly one crore borrowers and any MFI would have to update the loan sanctions in that site, thereby providing real time information about to lender. Any lender who continues to borrowers, beyond the maximum of two loans, will be penalised. The Principal Secretary of Rural Development, R.Subrahmanyam, IAS, who has played a proactive role in order to help the borrowers, points out that the state also has tried the smart card solutions in order to help the consumers, but they have not reached all the poor in the state, and hence it could take more time.

Monday, 3 January 2011

AP Government Submission to Malegam Committee

The Andhra Pradesh Government has made commendable efforts to protect borrowers nearly 10 million households/borrowers of Microfinance companies. As part of its proactive measures it submitted its views to the Reserve Bank of India appointed sub-committee (commonly referred to as the YH Malegam Committee). The report makes a strong case for regulation of MFIs by the State Government citing various constitutional provisions. The lucid analysis on the microfinance dynamics as well as various digressions on the part of the sector make the document an important addition to the body of literature on the sector. In an important insight during the course of a personal interaction, the Principal Secretary, Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Mr.R.Subrahmanym, IAS has pointed out that there seem to an important correlation between the NREGA and ability of the poor to pay their dues to the MFIs. He opines that the stoppage of NREGA works after the start of the monsoon rains in July, may have an important role in the inability to repay the loans to the MFIs. That perceptive observation should be cause for concern, especially for those optimists of the India growth story. If the poor households are not able to repay their loans with the Indian economy growing at 8-9 percent and with all the government spending, what would a fall in growth rates to say about 5-6 percent do to the ability of the poor to repay their loans. The interesting aspect of the recent developments is the extremely quick pace of technology adoption so that it would deny the microfinance companies an excuse about government inefficiencies. They now have a web based system that would enable the MFI to upload and seek the debt details of the borrowers in real time.

An attempt is made to summarise the important submissions of the Andhra Pradesh Government. The link to the full text of the report is given at the end of this post.

The submission starts by documenting the role of the State Government in Documenting in encouraging the Self Help Group (henceforth SHG) movement and creating the SHG-Bank linkages (p.2-7).

The submission makes a strong case against the concept of the 'bottom of the pyramid'.  In the case of the MFI business, the submission points out that "for the first time, profit has been made out of poor; although it has been used to spread activities into other areas" (p.9). This has become possible by the companies making profits off the poor for the first time and use the proceeds to spread into other areas. This has enabled the MFIs to mobilise funds from investors in different parts of the world.

The Government of AP has objected to various practices of the MFIs. These include pushing credit by the agents/officials of the MFIs through targets to various officials of the companies. These 'loans-with-no-questions-asked' have been provided without verifying the previous credit history of the borrower, without checking the purpose of the loan and if the loan has the ability to produce incremental income for servicing debt and without checking the ability of the borrower. It says that if the "repayment is not done on a day, the coercions starts as a threat and can end up driving the women for prostitution or even suicide" (p.9).

A pertinent point that the submission makes is that the supposed claim of the MFIs about 100 percent recovery is largely a mirage and the process of ever-greening of loans (a process of repaying old loans by sanctioning new loans) as common (p.9).

The report blames the practice of attracting private equity investors as another source of the problem.  It says that "these PEs are not social investors and therefore drive MFIs to earn more profits for them defeating the very purpose of Financial Inclusion" (p.10).

Importantly, the submission has pointed out that there is no difference between the MFIs and the traditional money lender, except that they are located outside the village, whereas the latter lived in the village. "In the interest rates, the methods of recovery, the attitude towards poor - there is no difference between the MFI and the moneylender anymore. Moneylenders don't go out and market their loans as MFIs do. Besides, moneylenders make loans strictly against collateral and this is a built in check on lending" (p.10-11).

The average per member loan for the MFIs in the state was Rs.13,900 which is almost equal to the per member loan accessed by members through SHGs from banking sector. However, many members have accessed loans from more than one agency and the borrowings are in the range of about Rs.40,000 - Rs.50,000. The repayment period of the MFIs is 50-52 weeks as against 3 years (p.13).

The submission notes that "the loans are accessed by about 80 lakh households, the average debt per household is about Rs.30,000 to be repaid per annum. This translates to nearly 75% of the total annual income to be spent on debt servicing. Clearly, the loans are not serviceable; and the credit that has been pumped is vastly excessive, and beyond the capacity of the poor" (p13). It finds it "ironical that the extent of debt contracted by poor from different MFIs is to be serviced within a period of ONE YEAR. It is also difficult to comprehend as to how the poor with a meager income will be in a position to service the loans ranging from Rs.30,000-50,000 paying usurious interest rates in excess of 30% and meet their living expenses all totaling to about Rs.75,000-100,000" (p.14).

Among the various issues that the Government of Andhra Pradesh objects include: Charging usurious rates of interest, levying of other charges, recovery of loans in weekly installments, multiple lending, opaqueness of operations and coercive recovery methods (p.13-18).

In the case of high interest rates it is points out that, "in the name of commercialisation of microfinance, MFIs have been charging high interest rate as high as 30-50% resulting in huge burden on the poor. It is a matter of concern that the flat rate of interest concept in MF sector intended to facilitate easy calculation of interest amounts by illiterate clientele is misued as effective rate of interest is concealed and poor do not understand the intricacies of such changes" (p.15).

MFIs also charge processing and other charges, collect interest free deposit upfront, collect interest rate deposits on a monthly basis, collect interest on loans upfront, and all these increase the cost of borrowing. It is to be understood that the MFIs claim operational cost in excess of 10% which is built into the interest cost but also recover the amounts separately to meet the same! It is therefore not astonishing to state that the RoA of MFIs is very high at about 4-5 %. (p.15)

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